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The role of expectations in the inflation process in the 
euro area 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 6/2005 
Maritta Paloviita – Matti Virén 




This paper analyses the role of inflation expectations in the euro area. On one 
hand, the question is how inflation expectations affect both inflation and output, 
and, on the other hand, how inflation expectations reflect developments in these 
variables. The analyses make use of a simple VAR model of inflation, inflation 
expectations and the output gap that allows for an analysis of the dynamic 
interrelationship between these variables. This model is estimated on aggregate 
euro area data, pooled euro area country data and individual country data for the 
period 1979–2003. The empirical results give strong support for the idea that 
inflation expectations are the key ingredient of the inflationary process for the 
whole euro area and for most individual countries as well. Inflation expectations 
also have a significant negative impact on output. As for the determination of 
inflation expectations, it turns out that they are relatively persistent, almost as 
persistent as output. Even so, and especially in the medium term, inflation 
expectations adapt to developments in both output and (actual) inflation. 
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Odotusten rooli euroalueen inflaatioprosessissa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 6/2005 
Maritta Paloviita – Matti Virén 




Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan inflaatio-odotusten roolia euroalueella. Kysymys on 
toisaalta siitä, kuinka inflaatio-odotukset vaikuttavat sekä inflaatioon että tuotan-
toon, ja toisaalta siitä, kuinka inflaatio-odotukset heijastavat näiden muuttujien 
kehitystä. Analyysi perustuu yksinkertaiseen VAR-mallin, jossa muuttujina ovat 
inflaatio, inflaatio-odotukset ja kokonaistuotanto; viimeksi mainitusta muuttujana 
on tarkemmin sanoen niin sanottu tuotantokuilu. Mallin avulla voidaan tutkia 
näiden muuttujien välisiä dynaamisia riippuvuuksia. Malli estimoidaan koko 
euroalueen kattavalla aikasarja-aineistolla, euroalueen maiden aikasarja–poikki-
leikkaus-aineistolla sekä yksittäisten maiden aikasarja-aineistoilla ajanjaksolta 
1979–2003. Empiiriset tulokset osoittavat selvästi, että inflaatio-odotukset ovat 
keskeinen tekijä sekä koko euroalueen että useimpien yksittäisten maiden 
inflaatioprosessissa. Inflaatio-odotukset vaikuttavat (negatiivisesti) myös tuotan-
toon. Inflaatio-odotusten määräytymisen tarkastelu osoittaa, että odotukset ovat 
melko jäykkäliikkeisiä, lähes yhtä jäykkäliikkeisiä kuin tuotanto. Erityisesti 
keskipitkällä aikavälillä inflaatio-odotukset sopeutuvat sekä tuotannon että 
toteutuneen inflaation muutoksiin. 
 
Avainsanat: inflaatio, odotukset, rahapolitiikka, Phillipsin käyrä 
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Controlling inflation is the main object of central banks. For that purpose, central 
banks need to know both the determinants and the basic features of the 
transmission mechanism of inflation. Given the fact that both theoretical 
considerations and empirical evidence say that inflation expectations are a crucial 
element in these respects it is obvious that the nature of inflation expectations 
should be carefully examined. 
 Somewhat  surprisingly,  inflation expectations have been analysed relatively 
little. This is mainly because we have only limited amount of data on “realized” 
inflation expectations. In most cases, inflation expectations have been derived not 
from observed survey or published forecast data but by using the orthogonality 
conditions connected with the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) by means 
of the GMM estimator. That allows estimating and testing key behavioural 
equations but it does not really allow for an analysis of the determinants inflation 
expectations. Thus, the estimation results of Phillips curves are not very 
informative in terms of the propagation mechanism of inflation and inflation 
expectations. Nor are they very informative in terms of policy conclusions. Take a 
simple question of how to reduce inflation. Conventional Phillips curve results 
just give the impact of the cyclical situation (say, output gap) on current inflation 
but the role of inflation expectations remains some sort of “black box” even if it is 
clear that inflation expectations is the most important variable.
1 Phillips curves 
suffer from other problems as well. They fit rather badly into the data and 
reasonable results can be obtained only by introducing some auxiliary variables to 
the estimating equations (like lags in the case of the so-called hybrid version of 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve). Against this background it is obvious that we 
need a more general – and more data consistent – representation of the model. 
  The situation is quite different if we use data on “realized” inflation 
expectations. Then we could see at least, what is the independent role of inflation 
expectations. Moreover we could find out how inflation expectations react to 
other variables or policies or policy regimes. 
  With the expectations data the main source is the regularly published 
macroeconomic forecasts made by government (finance ministries), research 
institutes and international organisations – like the OECD. All of these publish at 
least some form of inflation forecasts. The problem with most of the data is the 
fact that the values cannot be compared across countries and it difficult to 
construct a consistent aggregate Euro area data from these series. Thus, in these 
respects, we are left with the OECD data. Luckily, the so-called Consensus 
Forecast data also provide survey-based inflation forecasts in the same format for 
                                                 
1 It is noticeable that published expectations (forecasts) are not even used as instruments for 
expected inflation in the REH framework. See, however, Paloviita and Mayes (2005).  
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all European countries. The problem is that the data only cover the period 1989–
2003 which is very short for all analytical purposes.
2 
  Recently, there has been growing interest in the issue of nature and role of 
inflation expectations. Thus, for instance Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) 
provide an analysis on volatility of inflation expectations and an analysis of 
sensitivity of expectations to realized inflation.
3 A special emphasis in the paper is 
the distinction between inflation targeting (and non-targeting) countries. In this 
paper we in a sense continue these analyses by specifying a small VAR model 
which not only includes inflation and inflation expectations but also the real 
economy driving variable, output, or more precisely the output gap. Quite 
obviously, this model can be seen as some sort of empirical generalization of the 
Phillips curve and in addition a some sort of nested model to various Phillips 
curve variants, which allows also an analysis of the determinants of inflation 
expectations. 
  In what follows, we shortly introduce the analytical framework. Then in 
section 3, we explain the reporting of results. In the following section they are 




Our empirical analysis deals with the Euro area thus the data come the Euro area 
countries only. The analysis is based on a simple VAR model which in the basic 
form consists of three variables: inflation ∆p, inflation expectations ∆p
e and the 
output gap. In some occasions the model is completed by world (US) inflation, 
which gives us a some sort of VARX representation. Moreover the output gap is 
replaced by the labour share LS, GDP growth, ∆GDP or by simple time trend 
deviation of GDP.
4 The choice between these measures is known to be a difficult 
conceptual and measurement issue but in this study the choice does not really play 
a crucial role as it turns out from subsequent estimation results. It may well be that 
the issue is more compelling when estimating a conventional one-equation 
Phillips curve. 
                                                 
2 More precisely, Consensus Economics provides data for consumer prices. The data are monthly 
and thus include a large number of observations but when used with annual (output) data the high-
frequency properties cannot be utilized. In what follows, we use the data only in the pooled cross-
country analysis where the degrees of freedom are reasonable. 
3 In addition, a number of papers have recently been published using survey or forecast based 
inflation expectations data in estimating the Phillips curve(s). See, for instance, Adam and Padula 
(2003) and Paloviita (2005). Alternative measure for Euro area inflation expectations can be found 
in Gerlach (2004). 
4 In this connection, we bypass discussion on the proper concept or measure of the output gap. 
Results with alternative proxies suggest that the choice is not a crucial issue here.  
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  The key variable is inflation expectations. As pointed out above, the series are 
derived from the OECD, although also the so-called Consensus Forecast values 
are used for it. In the basic set-up, ∆p
e is the inflation forecast for the following 
year which is published by the OECD in June of the current year. Thus, it is 
assumed that the decision of pricing the output, determining the volume of output 
and forming inflation expectations are made at the same moment.
5 Obviously, we 
cannot pin down the exact timing of decisions with annual data and, therefore, we 
also make the analysis with forecast for the following year which is published in 
December of the current year and also with forecast for the current year, which is 
published in December of the previous year.
6 The quality of OECD forecasts from 
the point of view of Rational Expectations have been analyzed in several 
occasions (see eg OECD 1993 and Virén 1998). The analyses have shown that 
there are some problems with unbiasedness especially in early days but still the 
quality of the data is reasonable also in this respect. The same conclusion is 
reached also this time (see Appendix 1 for details).
7 
  In identifying the shocks we use the simple Cholesky decomposition. This is 
mainly motivated by the fact that our VAR model encompasses several theoretical 
models and we do not want at this stage to nail it down to any of those. Moreover, 
if one considers the structural VAR identifications schemes none of those appears 
to be an obvious candidate in this case. The Blanchard-Quah (1989) identification 
scheme, which is widely applied, is not easily applicable in our three-variable 
case, considering especially the perceived different roles of actual inflation and 
expected inflation. As for more general schemes (cf eg Giannini (1992) and 
Amisano & Giannini (1997)), we found that adopting one of those might bring too 
much specification uncertainty into the analysis. 
  Moreover, the variable ordering with the Cholesky decomposition appears to 
be quite obvious and requires only a slight amount of experimenting. The 
recursive system which is in our mind boils down to the following variable 
ordering: output gap, inflation expectations (for the next period) and actual 
inflation. With the two first variables, there could be a reverse ordering so that 
altogether we might have the following alternatives to applied and compared: 
var1 = {y, ∆p
e, ∆p} and var2 = {∆p
e, y, ∆p}. These orderings can be seen from 
purely technical point of view although they obviously reflect some deeper 
differences in economic modelling strategies. First of all, one may consider the 
determination of output in a RBC framework and think that output shocks are 
mainly determined by non-monetary factors (technology and so on) and thus they 
                                                 
5 Because we use annual data, one might imagine that the mid-year values correspond to the 
average annual values of production and the price level. 
6 The latter concept corresponds, in fact, to the Expectations Augmented Phillips curve 
specification. 
7 Similar result is, in fact, reached in Forsells and Kenny (2002) for the EU Commission’s 
Consumer Survey.  
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will only weak respond to inflation shocks. Alternatively, one could think that the 
output gap is determined by the future path of real interest rate that makes it 
exogenous to both current inflation and inflation expectations. 
  These considerations would place the output gap as the first variable (ie give 
ordering var1). But we could also think that the inflation expectations have a more 
profound (in a sense “deeper”) role in the model. One may think that inflation 
expectations are related to expectations on future monetary policy. Thus, inflation 
expectations shocks are related to such things as changes in credibility of 
monetary policy, perceived changes in effectiveness of monetary policy and 
prerequisites of policy (eg from the institutional point of view). All of these do not 
need to be conditional to output developments and therefore, the var2 ordering 
could be quite plausible as well. 
  What is clear in our mind, however, that actual inflation cannot be the first 
variable ordering because actual inflation reflects both output and expected 
inflation shocks. In addition, it reflects all kinds of short-term shocks which are 
related to eg imperfect control over monetary policy and to price shocks induced 
by market imperfections. If we indeed had a recursive system in which both actual 
inflation and output would precede expected inflation we could interpret that 
system as a representation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve from the point of 
view of rational expectations. Then, however, there would be very little room for 
the independent role inflation expectations. They would just reflect changes in 
actual inflation and output – in the same way as in the “instrumental equations” 
for expected inflation in the one-equation model. The idea of estimating the VAR 
was, however, to get more sort of general assessment of the role of inflation 
expectations and not a priori to restrict its role to something not very important. 
  In what follows, we thus use the both above-mentioned orderings although we 
may already now mention that the results are qualitatively rather similar. In 
quantitative terms, the results differ somewhat because the residuals are 
contemporaneously correlated. This is obviously due to the annual frequency 
which, in turn, is dictated by the OECD forecasting system. 
  The analyses make use of the Euro area data which cover (after 2 lags) the 
period 1979–2003 (ie 25 observations). Needless to say, the sample is very short 
and the data partly artificial because the Euro area did not exist before 1999. 
Partly because of that we also use individual country data, and pooled cross-
country data with different pooling and estimation restrictions. When the pooled 
data are used, total number of observations is 292. 
  The main problem in our analysis is the apparent  non-stationarity of some of 
the time series (within our sample period). If we use the output gap as the real  
11 
economy driving variable, it is, at least in its Hodrick-Prescott variant, stationary.
8 
But with the sample period of 1977–2003 both inflation and inflation expectations 
are non-stationary according to standard tests. If we want to preserve the set of 
variables as it is in the Phillips curve we have to move to first differences of the 
three variables (ie second differences of the price level and output and first 
differences of inflation expectations). If we used the labour share as the driving 
variable we would end up with the case where all three variables (inflation, 
inflation expectations and the labour share) are non-stationary. Finally, we could 
use GDP (Gross Domestic Product in constant prices) directly. The change rate of 
GDP is roughly stationary in the same way as the deviation of GDP from linear 
time trend.
9 Both of these are used in analysis – mainly for the sake of evaluating 
the robustness of the results. 
  Using the Vector Error Correction Model would obviously solve some of the 
problems and we do indeed carry out the analysis also within that framework. 
More precisely, we want to impose an error-correction term in the terms of 
inflation and inflation expectations assuming that inflation and inflation 
expectations cannot diverge in the long-run. Unfortunately, the whole sample is 
characterized with falling inflation so that inflation expectations are always below 
current inflation. Hence, the cointegrating restriction ∆p
e = ∆p in the long run is 
not consistent with the data in this sample.
10 Obviously, one can use a data-
consistent error-correction term. That is in fact done in a set of estimation 
exercises reported in Appendix 2. These results do not seem differ from the 
general pattern and therefore we not proceed any longer with this approach. 
  Before turning to the results it is useful to point out that our VAR model is not 
really very suitable to open economy environment in which all countries have 
been most of the sample period. A tempting alternative would be to extend the 
model with some open-economy variables but that would unnecessarily 
complicate our analyses at this stage. Hence we only do the following: we add 
foreign (US) inflation as an exogenous variable in our VAR specification. The 
idea is again to see whether that makes any difference to the results with the basic 
three-variable VAR model. 
  The use of the VAR model suffers from some other well-known shortcomings 
as well. All analyses are related to shocks in different variables. Thus, we cannot 
consider the effects of expected changes in different variables. Shocks of inflation 
expectations may sound a bit difficult to interpret but recalling that, in our mind, 
                                                 
8 The generally used Hodrick-Prescott filter suffers from several problems which can potentially 
affect the results in crucial way (see eg Cogley and Nason 1995). Therefore, we also used the 
OECD own output gap to check the robustness of results. These data do not cover the whole 
period and therefore used the HP filtered output gap series. 
9 If the output gap is created by introducing a linear trend to the estimating equation all other 
variables are, of course, also (similarly) affected. 
10 The cointegration properties of actual and forecast variables is analysed in eg Aggarwal et al 
(1995).  
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inflation expectations basically reflect the general public’s expectations on policy 
credibility and effectiveness corresponding shocks are equally plausible as the 
actual inflation and/or output shocks. Measurement is then another issue. It may 
well be that our measures (data) for inflation expectations suffer from 
measurement errors more that the actual inflation and output gap. Here we can do 
very little clarify this point. By using different (survey) data we obviously get 
some idea of the seriousness of this problem. 
 
 
3  Reporting the results 
The main data are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The former contains the 
aggregate data and latter the (pooled) individual country data. Figure 3 compares 
the June and December forecasts (from the OECD) which both are used in the 
analyses. Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic interactions between inflation 
and inflation expectations. This figure shows that for the sample period, these 
variables show the same non-stationary features (stochastic trends) but besides 
that the series are not completely randomly related. Thus, there are three episodes 
where some sort inflation – inflation expectations cycles can be detected (for 
1986, 1990 and 1999). These obviously tell something about the effect of “third” 
variables (oil prices, German unification and the Euro). 
  As for the VAR analysis, we follow here the standard practice in reporting 
three sets of results: the parameter estimates of the VAR model(s), the variance 
decompositions and the impulse responses. Because we have so many alternatives 
in terms of specification of the output variable, price index, country set, and lag 
structure we have to be quite selective in presenting the results. Anyway, we try to 
cover all relevant combinations.
11 
  When estimating the VAR, we of course have to fix the lag length. In our 
case, the choice turned out to be a bit tricky because it was not easy to choose 
between one lag, VAR(1), and two lags, VAR(2), which are the only relevant 
alternatives with our data. The problem is due to the fact that the second lag is 
only marginally significant. Generally, it is (only) the output gap which requires 
the second lag. Luckily the lag length does not really affect the qualitative nature 
of results but still it makes some difference as can been from the subsequent 
results (see Tables 1 and 4, in particular). As for the Cholesky decomposition, we 
report the majority of results with the var1 ordering. This can be motivated by the 
fact that output is more persistent than inflation expectations and that the var1 
ordering is more conservative from the point of inflation expectations, Thus, in 
                                                 
11 A full set of results is available (by E-mail) upon request from the authors.  
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terms of variance decompositions, it may give the lower bound for relative 
importance of various shocks. 
  In addition to the choice of the lag length and the variable ordering in the 
Cholesky decomposition, we face the choice of the inflation variable. Thus, we 
have to choose between the GDP deflator (DEF) and consumer prices (PC). Both 
alternatives can be defended and partly because of that we have estimated our 
models with both variables (concerning both the actual data and expected/forecast 
values). In what follows, we mainly report the results with the GDP deflator. That 
is because we feel that this choice is more consistent with the choice of the scale 
variable (ie the GDP gap) and because we really focus on the economy-wide 
developments of prices and output. 
  Technically, reporting goes as follows: The variance decompositions for 
different Cholesky decompositions and data sets are presented in Tables 1–7, 
estimation results in Tables 8–9 and impulse responses in Figures 5–6. When 
presenting the variance decompositions, we just scrutinize the very short-run 
results (for horizons of one and two years) and the long-run results (which in 
practice deal with the time horizon of 20 years). These three data points can in 
fact, illustrate most of the interesting changes because all changes are more or less 
monotonic (as can be seen already from the reported impulse responses). 
 
 
4  Summary and interpretation of results 
In what follows, we briefly summarize the main findings and discuss their 
implications to monetary policy and further research. 
 
(1) In general, our VAR model performs reasonably well for both the aggregate 
data and pooled cross-country data.
12 Moreover, the results for different 
variable definitions and specifications of the VAR are very similar. True, 
differencing makes some difference and it is, of course, a bit alarming 
because it could reflect some weaknesses in the dynamic specification. Most 
obviously the result reflects the changing nature of inflation which, in turn, 
reflects the change in the inflation objectives. One way solve this problem 
                                                 
12 This shows up in estimation results which are reported in Tables 8 and 9. If the VAR (inflation) 
equations are compared with Phillips curves which have been estimated using the same sample 
and data the VAR equations have slightly bigger standard errors. The problem is only that with eg 
the pooled cross-country data the coefficients of the New Keynesian Phillips curve are incorrect 
(the coefficient of output gap is negative and the coefficient of the expected inflation exceeds one). 
The Expectations Augmented Phillips curve performs much better especially in terms of the 
coefficient estimates. However, it cannot be directly compared with the VAR equations because it 
has current period values on the right-hand side. With the supply curve, similar arguments apply. 
See Tillmann (2005) for the most recent evaluation of the performance of the New Keynesian 
Phillips Curve.  
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would be to introduce an explicit inflation target to the system in the way of 
Gerlach and Svensson (2003) for instance. We have not experimented with 
this option but introducing world (US) inflation could be seen as one sort of 
solution to this problem. It does not, however, provide a solution to this open 
issue. For us, more important is, however, that introducing this variable does 
not change the basic results. 
(2) Inflation expectations are very important in the determination of inflation. 
Thus, innovations in expectations account for more than one third of the 
(forecast) variance of inflation irrespectively of time horizon. Even in the long 
run inflation expectations exert a significant and independent effect on actual 
inflation developments and their relative importance rather increases than 
decreases with the length of the time horizon. The percentage share can go up 
to 50 per cent. In other words, changes in output growth and (past) inflation 
cannot fully explain the future path of inflation. 
(3) Inflation and inflation expectations do explain only a small fraction of output 
(forecast) variance. This suggests that the direct linkage between 
monetary/price shocks and output is quite weak indeed. But the nature of this 
linkage still makes sense. Scrutinizing the impulse responses (Figures 5 and 
6) it can be seen that inflation expectations shocks have negative, statistically 
significant and quite persistent effect on the output gap while the effect of the 
actual inflation on output is a bit sensitive to the specification and data. In 
general, it has either a positive or a negative short-run effect but in all cases a 
negative long-run effect. Interpretation of these results is not all clear because 
we do not have interest (exchange) rates in the model but it looks tempting to 
interpret the negative output effect of inflation expectations as coming from 
adverse supply (cost) shocks, and the positive effects of actual inflation as 
consequences of temporary demand disturbances. 
(4) There seems to be only a minor difference between the effects with OECD 
forecasts and Consensus (survey) Forecasts (cf Table 6). Thus, the 
performance of inflation expectations is not due to the specific OECD data 
but it probably reflects the overall market sentiment in terms of future 
inflation.  Future experiments with national data sets may allow for more 
affirmative conclusions in this respect. 
(5) Inflation expectations react in the same way to both output and inflation 
shocks. It is hard to say which of these variables is “more important” in 
determining expectations because in this respect the variance decompositions 
produce a bit conflicting results depending on the specification and the data 
set. But clearly there is some propagation mechanism between output and 
inflation developments, on the one hand, and inflation expectations, on the 
other hand. Even then, the most important element is the persistence of 
inflation expectations: even after 20 years almost half of the forecast variance 
of inflation expectations can be attributed to this variable itself. Thus, within a  
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typical business-cycle period, errors in inflation expectations do not die out. It 
is interesting to compare this result with the behaviour of actual inflation; 
there the shocks are much more short-living and less persistent. This is 
remarkable even if the effects of own shocks to expectations diminish faster 
than in the case of the output gap variables. 
(6) The impulse responses suggest that the effects of inflation and output shocks 
last more than ten years. With the aggregate data Euro area data, the duration 
of effects is typically shorter than with the pooled cross-country data. In the 
latter data, where individual country differences show up and where high-
inflation countries have more weight, the duration of inflation effects, dealing 
with expected inflation, in particular, is much longer. In fact, this also shows 
up in individual country estimates (cf eg Table 8). 
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Inflation cannot be modelled or understood without analyzing inflation 
expectations. This fact is again confirmed in our analysis. The fact also shows up 
in the recent data. In the Euro area, inflation expectations have come down quite 
dramatically from the end of 1970s. Quite clearly, actual inflation has followed 
the same pattern and by itself reinforced the falling trend in inflation expectations. 
Although we cannot exactly say what has been the contribution of various factors, 
including the policy targets, to changes in inflation expectations we can conclude 
that (independent) role of expectations in the inflation process has been, and 
obviously still is, of crucial importance. 
  The central role of expectations in inflation dynamics has strong implications 
for the design of monetary policy. It means that if inflation expectations are 
anchored by credible monetary policy inflation will be more stable. Moreover, if 
the persistence of inflation indeed comes from the persistence of expectations, as 
this study shows, policies affecting expectations are crucial in all efforts towards 
disinflation. Stable and low inflation would, in turn, minimize losses to the 
economy and provide the best environment for strong and balanced growth. 
  Against this background, the role and nature of inflation expectations clearly 
deserves even more attention and analysis. Thus far, a lot time have been spent in 
trying to identify and measure inflation expectations but very little is known 
empirically about the possible independent role of expectations in the inflation 
process and, equally important, about the determinants of expectations.
13 
Knowing merely the fact that inflation expectations are unbiased is not 
informative from the point of view a policy-maker or policy analysis. In this 
                                                 
13 Some interesting analyses do exit, however. See eg Bonato et al (1999) who try to estimate the 
role policy announcements on (monetary conditions) expectations.  
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respect, the VAR analysis gives at least some rough idea of the nature and 
magnitude of main interrelationships. 
  Because the data strongly favours the interpretation that inflation expectations 
do not immediately adjust to changes in actual inflation and output we have good 
reasons study more thoroughly the origins of inflation expectations. The VARs 
which we have used here are one way of solving the problem but presumably 
there are several alternatives to this choice. One might think that event studies, 
say in the form of major policy decisions, might provide more insight to the 
determination of expectations. With survey based data we could also make use of 




Table 1    Comparison of var1 and var2 variance 
     decompositions 
 





  ∆p  ∆p
e
  gap  ∆p 
gap, 1  100.0  0.0  0.0  17.7  82.3  0.0 
gap, 2  97.7  2.0  0.2  27.0  72.7  0.2 
gap, 20   93.1  5.2  1.7  31.0  67.3  1.7 
∆p
e, 1  17.7 82.3 0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
∆p
e, 2  36.0 63.2 0.8  91.3 7.9  0.8 
∆p
e, 20  47.7 40.7 11.6 71.7 16.7 11.6 
∆p, 1  2.7  20.8  76.5  23.3  0.2  76.5 
∆p, 2  28.1  38.3  33.5  60.6  5.9  33.5 
∆p, 20  42.9  28.3  28.8  56.0  15.2  28.8 







   ∆gap  ∆
2p 
∆gap, 1  100  0.0  0.0  19.1  80.9  0.0 
∆gap, 2  93.4  0.2  6.4  19.5  74.0  6.4 
∆gap, 20   90.4  3.5  6.1  23.0  70.9  6.1 
∆
2p
e, 1  19.1 80.9 0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
∆
2p
e, 2  45.1 53.2 1.7  73.6 24.7 1.7 
∆
2p
e, 20  47.9 50.3 1.9  73.6 24.5 1.9 
∆
2p, 1  1.1 26.4  72.5  25.7  1.7 72.5 
∆
2p, 2  31.4 30.8 37.7 52.1 10.1 37.7 
∆
2p, 20  41.6 26.7 31.7 50.4 17.9 31.7 
First 9 rows correspond to the level form model and the subsequent 9 rows 
correspond to first difference specification. The three left hand side columns 
correspond to var1 decomposition and the three right hand side columns the var2 
decomposition. ∆
2 denotes second (log) differences. All equations include two 
lags. The data are aggregate Euro area data.  
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Table 2    Comparison of variance decompositions with 
      different inflation forecasts 
 





  ∆p gap  ∆p
e
  ∆p 
Data for ∆p
e
  December t forecast for t+1  December t-1 forecast for t 
gap,  1  100.0 0.0  0.0  100.0 0.0  0.0 
gap,  2  99.4 0.2  0.4  95.7 0.9  3.4 
gap, 20   97.1  2.4  0.5  84.8  7.2  7.9 
∆p
e, 1  30.0  70.0 0  0.0  99.9 0 
∆p
e, 2  55.1 41.8  3.1  22.8 62.2  14.9 
∆p
e, 20  71.3 17.3  11.5 54.6 9.4  35.9 
∆p,  1  8.0 23.0  69.0  7.5 44.8  47.7 
∆p,  2  38.9 41.7  19.4 37.6 21.2  41.2 
∆p,  20  67.5 15.1  17.4 51.9 4.4  43.7 









∆gap,  1  100 0.0  0.0  100 0.0  0.0 
∆gap,  2  88.8 2.1  9.1  91.0 2.5  6.6 
∆gap, 20   85.7  4.6  9.6  88.7  5.6  5.7 
∆
2p
e, 1  29.8  70.2  0.0 0.5 99.5  0.0 
∆
2p
e, 2  48.3 50.7  1.0  24.7 59.9  15.4 
∆
2p
e, 20  51.9 45.2  2.9  47.0 43.1  9.9 
∆
2p, 1  4.3 22.8  72.9  3.3 59.6  37.1 
∆
2p, 2  34.2 36.1  29.8 26.8 44.4  28.8 
∆
2p, 20  41.6 32.2  26.2 36.4 40.5  23.1 
The Table corresponds to Table 1 except that the results in columns 2–4 
correspond (for the part of ∆p
e) to the December OECD forecast for the next year, 
and in columns 5–7 (previous) December OECD forecast for the current year. The 
var1 variance decomposition is used in all cases. 
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Table 3    Comparison of variance decompositions using 
     different  specifications 
 
Variable to be decomposed (below), 
horizon  gap  ∆p
e
  ∆p 
Level, HP gap  42.9  28.3  28.8 
Level, HP gap, December forecast  67.5  15.1  17.4 
Level, HP gap, December forecast for 
the current year 
51.9 4.4  43.7 
Level,  ls,  trend  28.2 51.4 20.4 
Level, ∆GDP  29.7 41.8 28.6 
Level, GDP trend  39.9  41.5  18.5 
Level, HP gap, + US Def  29.6  7.1  63.4 
Level, HP gap, consumer prices  36.6  53.5  10.0 
Difference, HP gap  41.6  26.7  31.7 
Difference, ∆
2GDP  17.9 50.1 32.0 
Difference, HP gap + US Def  25.6  18.1  56.2 
Difference, HP gap, consumer prices  25.3  61.0  13.7 
Difference, HP gap, December 
forecast 
41.6 32.2 26.2 
Difference, HP gap, December 
forecast for the current year 
36.4 40.5 23.1 
All numbers are the long-run inflation variance decompositions, ∆p, 20 in a 




Table 4    Comparison of variance decompositions 
      with VAR(1) model 
 
Variable to be decomposed 
(below), lag, var1  gap  ∆p
e  ∆p 
gap, 1  100  0.0  0.0 
gap, 2  99.2  0.0  0.8 
gap, 20   92.1  5.4  2.4 
∆p
e, 1  25.5 74.5 0.0 
∆p
e, 2  40.6 57.7 1.7 
∆p
e, 20  64.7 33.9 1.4 
∆p,  1  19.0 14.6 66.4 
∆p,  2  30.9 30.9 38.2 
∆p,  20  62.2 25.1 12.7 




∆gap, 1  100  0.0  0.0 
∆gap, 2  94.9  0.1  5.0 
∆gap, 20   89.3  5.5  5.2 
∆
2p
e, 1 9.8  90.2  0.0 
∆
2p
e, 2  22.5 76.1 1.5 
∆
2p
e, 20  30.5 66.9 2.6 
∆
2p, 1  0.1  32.8  67.1 
∆
2p,  2  16.8 48.0 35.2 
∆
2p,  20  26.0 42.0 32.0 
var2  ∆
2p




e, 1 100.0  0.0  0.0 
∆
2p
e, 2 89.1  9.4  1.5 
∆
2p
e, 20  80.2 17.2 2.6 
∆gap, 1  9.8  90.2  0.0 
∆gap, 2  8.4  86.5  5.0 
∆gap,  20    11.3 83.4 5.2 
∆
2p, 1  30.9  2.1  67.1 
∆
2p, 2  59.3  5.5  35.2 
∆
2p,  20  52.6 15.4 32.0 
The data are aggregated Euro area data. The first two blocks (18 rows) correspond 
to the var1 decomposition with VAR(1) model and the third block (nine last rows) 
the var2 decomposition with the same model. 
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Table 5    Variance decompositions with pooled 
      cross-country data for the Euro area 
 





  ∆p 
gap, 1  100.0  0.0  0.0 
gap, 2  99.2  0.0  0.8 
gap, 20   95.1  2.3  2.6 
∆p
e, 1  3.8 96.2  0.0 
∆p
e, 2  7.3 92.6  0.1 
∆p
e, 20  15.1 84.1 0.7 
∆p, 1  2.0  35.6  62.4 
∆p, 2  8.8  54.5  36.7 
∆p, 20  13.5  69.2  17.3 





∆gap, 1  100.0  0.0  0.0 
∆gap, 2  99.5  0.4  0.1 
∆gap, 20   97.8  2.1  0.1 
∆
2p
e, 1  2.6 97.4  0.0 
∆
2p
e, 2  5.4 94.4  0.2 
∆
2p
e, 20  9.5 90.2  0.4 
∆
2p, 1  0.3 29.3  70.4 
∆
2p, 2  3.9 29.4  66.6 
∆
2p, 20  5.6 29.1  65.3 
Estimates are based on an artificial Euro economy which is obtained by stacking 
the time series of gap, ∆p
e and ∆p from the 12 countries’ as a single (unweighted) 




Table 6    Comparison of variance decompositions 






  ∆pc gap  ∆pc
e  ∆pc 




  (consensus) 
 
  (OECD)   
gap, 1  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
gap, 2  98.7  0.3  0.9  97.4  0.1  2.5 
gap, 20   92.0  5.4  2.5  92.9  1.7  5.4 
∆p
e, 1  4.3 95.7  0  6.5 93.5  0.0 
∆p
e, 2  7.5 90.7  1.8 10.7  88.2  1.2 
∆p
e, 20  26.1 71.8  2.1  25.0 73.7  1.2 
∆p, 1  10.7  31.1  58.2  9.0  28.6  62.3 
∆p, 2  24.6  35.3  40.1  19.5  41.0  39.5 
∆p, 20  42.7  32.5  24.8  36.2  41.1  22.7 









∆gap, 1  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
∆gap, 2  99.0  0.8  0.2  99.7  0.0  0.3 
∆gap, 20   98.4  1.3  0.3  99.6  0.0  0.3 
∆
2p
e, 1  0.2 99.8  0  4.7 95.3  0.0 
∆
2p
e, 2  7.5 87.3  5.2 9.9 88.8  1.3 
∆
2p
e, 20  10.5 84.4  5.1  11.8 86.9  1.4 
∆
2p, 1  7.1 33.6  59.2  5.0 41.6  53.4 
∆
2p, 2  12.6 34.4  53.1 13.4 41.9  44.6 
∆
2p, 20  15.5 33.1  51.4 15.8 40.7  43.5 
These values are based on pooled, unweighted cross-country data. The variance 
decompositions are derived with var1 variable ordering with VAR(1) model. The 
results are comparable to those in Table 5 except for the fact that the sample 
period is considerably shorter 1991–2003, consumer prices are used instead of the 
GDP deflator and the OECD June forecast values are compared with Consensus 
Forecast June values. 
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Table 7    Variance decompositions 
      with individual country data 
 
variable to be decomposed 
(below), horizon  gap  ∆p
e
  ∆p 
Austria, ∆p, 20  28.6  46.9  24.5 
Belgium, ∆p, 20  16.2  52.5  31.3 
Finland, ∆p, 20  37.8  44.6  17.6 
France, ∆p, 20  36.9  49.2  13.8 
Germany, ∆p, 20  30.7  42.1  27.2 
Greece, ∆p, 20  13.7  81.9  4.3 
Ireland, ∆p, 20  16.3  38.6  45.1 
Italy, ∆p, 20  51.9  20.4  27.7 
Luxembourg, ∆p, 20  1.0  29.9  69.1 
Netherlands, ∆p, 20  36.9  30.2  32.9 
Portugal, ∆p, 20  54.4  33.9  11.6 
Spain, ∆p, 20  16.2  47.4  36.3 






e, 20  38.5 18.5 43.0 
Belgium, ∆p
e, 20  4.6 33.2  62.2 
Finland, ∆p
e, 20  13.6 28.2 58.3 
France, ∆p
e, 20  6.5 57.3  36.2 
Germany, ∆p
e, 20  34.4 7.0  58.6 
Greece, ∆p
e, 20  0.7 44.9  54.4 
Ireland, ∆p
e, 20  9.6 26.1  64.3 
Italy, ∆p
e, 20  26.0 47.4 26.6 
Luxembourg, ∆p
e, 20  1.7 12.7  85.6 
Netherlands, ∆p
e, 20  24.0 25.5 50.5 
Portugal, ∆p
e, 20  19.3 42.2 38.5 
Spain, ∆p
e, 20  3.9 30.8  65.3 
With all countries, var1 variance decomposition is used. 
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Table 8    Estimation results with aggregate Euro area 





e  ∆p gap  ∆p
e  ∆p 
Data   Aggregate Euro area  Pooled cross-country  
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First 6 rows correspond to the level form model while the subsequent 6 rows are 
derived from the first difference specification. Pooled cross-country data are un-
weighted; the corresponding variance decompositions are reported in Tables 5 and 
6). All estimates are PNS estimates. 
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Table 9    Estimation results with pooled cross-country data 
 
Dependent variable   gap  ∆p
e  ∆p 






































R2/SEE 0.705/1.374  0.889/1.364  0.913/1.485 
Wald 7.30  74.78  3.72 














































R2/SEE 0.135/1.646  0.027/1.492  0.187/1.663 
Wald 11.48  109.22  68.96 
In the same way as in Table 8, the first 6 rows correspond to the level form model 
and the subsequent 6 rows the first difference model. Wald test statistics test the 
hypothesis that lagged inflation terms in the gap equal sum up to zero and in the 
inflation and expected inflation equations to one. The 5 % critical value is 3.80. 
Estimates are (un-weighted) OLS estimates with Pool-OLS estimator; the level 
form equations are estimated with the fixed-effects specification. 
  
26 












      HPGAP denotes the HP filtered output gap, DEF 
inflation in terms the GDP deflator and FDEF the 
corresponding OECD December inflation forecasts. 
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Figure 4   Evolution of inflation and inflation expectations 
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Wald tests for unbiasedness of inflation expectations 
Euro area/country   June forecast  December forecast 
  F-statistic  Probability F-statistic Probability 
Euro area, aggregated   0.757  0.482  1.938  0.165 
Euro area, pooled 
 
5.532  0.004 5.883 0.003 
Austria  0.481  0.625 1.008 0.379 
Belgium  1.952  0.167 9.994 0.001 
Finland  0.488  0.621 1.346 0.279 
France  4.234  0.029 0.516 0.603 
Germany  0.550  0.585 0.268 0.767 
Greece  4.716  0.020 3.928 0.033 
Ireland  1.088  0.355 0.518 0.602 
Italy  3.419  0.052 3.636 0.041 
Luxembourg  0.433  0.655 1.436 0.261 
Netherlands  1.374  0.275 2.710 0.086 
Portugal  2.400  0.115 1.992 0.160 
Spain  3.892  0.037 2.099 0.144 
All Wald tests are computed for the parameter restrictions a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 in 
. e p a a p t t 1 0
e




Pooled cross-country results with a VECM(2) model 



























































Variance decompositions  Gap  ∆p
e
  ∆p 
∆gap, 2  96.7  0.5  2.8 
∆gap, 20  72.6  10.5  16.9 
∆
2p
e, 2  0.3 97.7  2.0 
∆
2p
e, 20  1.7 74.7  23.6 
∆
2p,2  6.9 55.5  37.5 
∆
2p,20  14.3 47.6 38.1 
EC-term:  HPGAP + 4.54∆p
e  - 3.58∆p  
EC-term:  1.00∆p
e  - 0.76∆p, χ
2 (1) = 8.04 
EC-term:  1.00∆p
e  - 1.00∆p, χ
2(2)= 71.74 
Numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. The χ
2–test statistics are related to the 
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